Background. Our understanding of influenza A virus transmission between humans and pigs is limited. Methods. Beginning in 2015, we used a One Health approach and serial sampling to prospectively study 299 swine workers and 100 controls, their 9000 pigs, and 6 pig farm environments in China for influenza A viruses (IAVs) using molecular, culture, and immunological techniques. Study participants were closely monitored for influenza-like illness (ILI) events.
swine farm environments, as a source for IAV persistence and transmission. Our aims are (1) to identify and characterize enzootic and emergent IAVs; (2) to employ aerosol, fecal, and environmental swabs and water sampling to identify environmental areas with a high prevalence of IAVs; (3) to identify occupational risk factors for avian influenza virus infection; and (4) to identify serological and mucosal immunity biomarkers of protection against prevalent and emergent IAVs. In this report, we review the first 12 months (March 2015 to February 2016) of study activities.
METHODS

Study Population
Study participants were recruited via informed consent at each of 6 pig farms (3 each in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces) in China. Enrollment criteria for swine-exposed participants included ≥18 years of age, current exposure to pigs or pig manure as part of daily activities for >5 cumulative hours per week (swine husbandry, slaughtering, sales, etc), and self-reporting no immunocompromising conditions, acute respiratory tract infections, or pregnancies (for women) at the time of study enrollment. Control participants were recruited through community service centers from among participants living >10 km from a swine farm, and reporting having no exposure to pigs or swine manure as part of daily activities. Control participants were enrolled approximately 2 weeks after swine-exposed participants were enrolled in a 3:1 (exposed:control) ratio. Upon enrollment, serum specimen and nasal wash specimens were collected for study. If a participant developed an influenza-like illness (ILI), a study team member visited the study participant within 2 days of the report, interviewed the participant, completed an ILI questionnaire, and collected a nasal swab and a nasal wash specimen as well as an acute and >60-day convalescent serum sample. More details are recorded in the Supplementary Methods.
Pig and Swine Farm Environmental Sampling
To assess the burden of IAVs in the swine farm environment and to compare to prospective human data, every month each of the 6 farms was visited and a series of convenience samples from the farm environment and the pigs were collected: (1) 50 pig oral secretion specimens using a rope collection method; (2) 6 barn environmental swab specimens; (3) 6 pen-side fresh-water samples; (4) 6 pig fecal-slurry samples; and (5) six 30-minute aerosol samples. More details are recorded in the Supplementary Methods.
Laboratory Assays
IAV molecular detection, culture, sequencing, microneutralization (MN) serological assays, and immunoglobulin A (IgA) assessments were performed with standard methods as described in the Supplementary Methods. Considering the prevalence of swine-lineage and avian-lineage viruses in China, and their availability, we employed the following viruses in our 
Statistical Methods
Logistic regression, χ 2 , or Fisher exact tests with 95% confidence intervals were used to examine bivariate risk factor associations. Multivariate modeling was conducted using unconditional logistic regression for binary MN outcomes and ordered (proportional odds) logistic regression for ordinal outcomes (such as IgA values stratified into 4 categories). We screened data for associations using a cut-point of P < .10 and then employed a saturated model and manual backward elimination with a cutpoint of P < .05 to select the final covariates. Analyses were performed using Stata software version 14 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas).
Ethics Committee Approvals
The study protocol was approved by the institutional review boards of Duke University (Pro00056116) and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (no number given). The study was also approved by the Animal Care and Use Committee at Duke University (A187-14-08) and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS-20-14-009).
RESULTS
Study Farms and Subjects
Between March and September 2015, 6 farms and their workers were enrolled in this study (Figure 1 ). The enrolled farms varied in size (0.6-4 km 2 ), the average number of pigs on site per day (310-2500), number of swine houses , and prevalence of IAV as detected in environmental and pig oral secretion sampling (Supplementary Table 1 ). When visiting the farms, our research teams noted a frequent lack of biosecurity and sparse use of personal protective equipment, especially in the older and smaller farms. In at least 3 farms, ducks, geese, chickens, or dogs were housed very near or found comingling with pigs. Often there were no barriers to separate pigs from birds or rodents (Supplementary Figure 1) . Among the 399 participants, 299 were occupationally swine exposed and 100 were controls. Swine-exposed participants were more often male, older, less educated, more often lived at their work site, more likely to smoke, and less likely to have ever received influenza vaccines compared to controls (Supplementary Table 2 ).
Serological Results Upon Enrollment
Serological testing revealed that swine-exposed participants had a higher prevalence (13%) of elevated MN (titer ≥1:80) against swine SS1(H1N1) than did controls (6%). However, they had a lower prevalence (36.8%) of elevated MN against swine L22(H3N2). Study participants had sparse activity against H5N1, H7N9, and H9N2 avian influenza viruses (Supplementary Table 3 ). Nasal wash specimens from 10 swine-exposed participants and 2 controls were molecularly positive for IAV. Multivariate modeling for nasal wash IAV-positive samples suggested contact with animal disease outbreaks outside of work and exposure to poultry or pigs in other type of work as important predictors (Supplementary Table 4 ). Additional modeling for elevated antibody against swine SS1(H1N1) suggested that elevated nasal wash IgA titers, having no indoor water source, and not currently smoking were possibly important risk factors (Supplementary Table 5 ). Similarly, examining adjusted risk factors for elevated enrollment MN titers against swine L22(H3N2) ( Supplementary Table 6) suggested that no previous cardiac disease, no previous pig farming exposure, higher education, type of work, and frequent respiratory infections were important predictors. When total self-reported swine-exposure years (work and home) were plotted against log-transformed enrollment MN titers, there was a slight increasing MN titer trend with increasing exposure years against swine SS1(H1N1) but an unexpected, statistically significant, inverse trend in MN titers against swine L22(H3N2) (Supplementary Figure 2) .
Immunoglobulin A Antibody in Nasal Wash Upon Enrollment
Swine-exposed participants had higher total IgA concentrations for all 3 outcomes compared to controls: mean total IgA (1754 vs 584.7 ng/μL), mean IgA against swine SS1(H1N1) (652.8 vs 97.17 ng/μL), and mean IgA against swine L22(H3N2) (1078 vs 434.3 ng/μL) (Figure 2A -C). Total (work and home) swine-years of exposure plotted against the nasal wash total IgA log titers for swine SS1(H1N1) and swine L22(H3N2) viruses showed a slight increasing trend (Supplementary Figure 3) . Adjusted risk factor analyses for elevated nasal wash IgA-specific titer against swine SS1(H1N1) and swine L22(H3N2) revealed a strong positive association between the specific assays and a number of covariates representing poor hygiene (eg, lack of indoor water source, contact with chickens, exposure to person at work with an ILI) (Supplementary Tables 7 and 8 ).
Influenza-Like IllnessSurveillance
Between November 2015 and January 2016, a total of 32 ILI events were identified among 22 swine-exposed participants and 6 among controls. Among the 32 ILI nasopharyngeal swabs examined, 5 were positive for IAV, and 2 H1N1 isolates [(A/Shandong/NW11/2016(H1N1) and A/Shandong/ NW12/2016(H1N1)] were recovered from individual swabs obtained from a swine-exposed married couple (participants S-ILI-11 and S-ILI-12) ( Table 1) . No swabs had evidence of influenza B virus. The phylogenetic analysis showed that these 2 Among the 32 ILI events, the study participants' nasal wash virus-specific IgA levels against the swine SS1(H1N1) and swine L22(H3N2) strains were higher when they enrolled than when they had ILI ( Figure 2E and 2F), whereas no significant difference was observed for total IgA between enrollment and ILI ( Figure 2D ). Examining the serial sera specimens (enrollment, acute ILI, and convalescent ILI), 17 of the 32 (53%) ILI events were associated with at least one 4-fold rise in MN titer against a swine virus. Most 4-fold rises in titer were against the swine SS1(H1N1) ( Table 1) . Elevations in MN against the avian influenza viruses were sparse. Looking for evidence of cross-reactivity, we also examined the participants' ILI paired sera with a hemagglutination inhibition assay against A/Shandong/ NW11/2016. Six groups of sera had both 4-fold elevations against swine SS1(H1N1) and A/Shandong/NW11/2016(H1N1) ( Table  1) , indicating cross-reactivity between human pdm09 H1N1 virus and Eurasian avian-like H1N1 virus.
Influenza A Viruses in the Farms
During the period from March 2015 to February 2016, a total of 4884 samples were obtained from the 6 study farms and screened for IAVs. Forty-six of 396 (11.6%) environmental swabs, 235 of 3300 (7.1%) pig oral secretion, 23 of 396 (5.8%) water, 20 of 396 (5.1%) aerosol, and 19 of 396 (4.8%) fecal-slurry specimens were positive for influenza A. Sequencing results showed that swine-lineage H1N1 and H3N2 and A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses were detected in pig oral secretion and environmental swabs (Supplementary Table 9 ). Phylogenetic analysis revealed that hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes of these swine-lineage H1N1 viruses detected among pigs and in their farms were in the Eurasian avian-like H1N1 genetic lineage ( Figure 3A ; Supplementary Figure 4) , but internal genes of most Eurasian avian-like H1N1 viruses were from the A(H1N1)pdm09-like virus lineage (Supplementary Figure 4) , suggesting that reassortment had occurred ( Figure 3C ). All gene segments of A(H1N1) pdm09-like viruses identified in study pigs were very similar to previously identified A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses in humans and among the study's ILI participants ( Figure 3A ; Supplementary  Figure 4 ), again suggesting a previous reassortment had occurred ( Figure 3C ). While the HA and NA genes of 2 swine-lineage H3N2 Subjects were a married swine-exposed couple. Figure 4) , which also suggests a previous reassortment ( Figure 3C ). Collectively, these data suggest that transmission and reassortment between human-lineage Figure 3 . Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of the swine H1N1, swine H3N2, and A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses indentified in the present study. A, Hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) phylogenetic tree of swine H1N1 and A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses. B, HA and NA phylogenetic tree of swine H3N2 viruses. C, Genotypic constellations of the 8 segments of influenza A viruses in the present study. In C, the colors of the bars represent the lineage from the tree data in A and B. Abbreviations: EA, Eurasian; HA, hemagglutinin; M, matrix; NA, neuraminidase; ND, no data available; NP, nucleoprotein; NS, nonstructural; PA, polymerase acidic; PB, polymerase basic.
and swine-lineage influenza viruses have frequently occurred in these or related pig farms.
DISCUSSION
In this report, we review the first year of data from a 5-year study of 6 Chinese pig farms in 2 provinces in China. This complex work resulted in considerable molecular and immunological evidence that a number of swine and human-reservoired IAVs, especially very similar A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses, were circulating in the farms and likely moving back and forth across species. Similar H1N1 viruses were found in swine workers with ILI, in pigs, and the swine farm environment. The swine-exposed participants also had increased immunological evidence of previous and acute infection with swine-reservoired H1N1 and swine-reservoired H3N2 viruses. Although there were suggestions that serological titers to the swine-reservoired H3N2 may have been waning before our study period, there was also evidence that poor farm biosecurity and poor personal hygiene may have contributed to human IAV infection.
Soon after the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was detected in humans, multiple countries documented that A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses and their progeny were detected in pigs. Much of the international spread of swine-reservoired IAVs have been attributed to the movement of infected humans introducing the viruses to pigs [11, 12] as well as the movement of live pigs in trade [13, 14] . For example, Nelson et al [15] documented 49 global introductions of A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses from human to pigs from 2009 to 2011. In some cases, the introduced A(H1N1) pdm09-like viruses have outcompeted other swine H1N1 viruses in pigs. It is difficult to know if the A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses's competitive advantage has been due to continual reintroductions into pig herds from humans [11] , or increased fitness of the viruses [14] . Once introduced to pigs, reassortant viruses from A(H1N1)pdm09-like virus and other swine strains often result in the loss of A(H1N1)pdm09 HA and NA gene segments. Hence, quite a few pandemic variants have emerged with swine-like HA and NA gene segments and retentions of internal pandemic gene segments [16] , particularly the internal genes (polymerase acidic, nucleoprotein, and matrix). Whatever the cause for retention, the A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses are often sustained in pig herds, especially large, high-density herds [11, 17, 18] . It is of considerable concern that some progeny of A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses, especially those conserving the matrix gene, have caused a number of infections in humans [19] [20] [21] , including now more than 420 well-documented human cases since December 2005.
This study had some limitations. It seems likely that some level of elevated antibody against swine-lineage H1N1 and swine-lineage H3N2 viruses was due to cross-reactions from non-farmrelated human virus or vaccine exposures (Supplementary Table 2 ). As controls were younger and more likely to have received seasonal influenza vaccine, their immunological differences from the swine-exposed participants may have been confounded. This study's initial findings are similar in some ways to our smaller 2002-2004 cross-sectional study [22] and 2004-2005 limited prospective study [23] of US swine workers, which demonstrated that both the swine farmers and their family members were at increased risk of swine H1 infections. A follow-on modeling study [24] posited how, given the right conditions, swine workers might accelerate a swine influenza outbreak, which could be easily mitigated by offering them a 50% effective vaccine. Hence, we continue to advocate for seasonal influenza vaccine use among swine workers and that swine workers should be high on the priority list for the receipt of pandemic vaccines [22] .
Regarding correlates of immunity, it seems a bit too early to tell if we will identify important findings in this prospective One Health work. IgA-specific antibody against swine viruses holds some promise, as it was an important risk factor for elevated MN results (Supplementary Tables 5 and 6 ), as IgA-specific titers dropped before a participant developed ILI ( Figure 2E and 2F), and as titers increased with pig-exposure years (Supplementary Figure 3B and 3C) . However, risk associations did not increase with increasing titers as one might expect (Supplementary Tables  5 and 6 ), and sometimes the risk association was not specific to the virus studied (eg, IgA titers against swine-lineage H3N2 virus were associated with elevated MN titers against swine-lineage H1N1 virus) (Supplementary Table 5 ).
This study is unique for its prospective One Health approach of concomitantly studying swine worker, pigs, and swine farm environments. Other One Health-oriented studies of influenza outbreaks in swine farms [25] , animal markets [26] , and swine shows [27] [28] [29] echo our findings that pigs and people are likely often sharing influenza viruses. Hence, influenza surveillance among pigs and pig workers is very important. We argue that most anywhere in the world where pig farms exist, especially large farms, disparate viruses could be mixed, yielding novel IAVs. These viruses can move very fast across large geographical areas and rapidly change. In a manner of months after our first detections of the A(H1N1)pdm09-like virus in US pigs [27, 30] , similar viruses were found in pigs in numerous countries. Much of this movement of virus is thought to be from humans introducing the virus to pig herds or from the movement of infected pigs. Soon after the 2009 pandemic broke, a 2010 study of 1029 nasal swabs from healthy pigs in Jiangsu Province, China [31] , yielded 8 A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses. Since then, the prevalence and variety of A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses has expanded. A recent study of 37 213 pigs (2010-2012) in southern China yielded 387 IAVs and, among them, at least 17 unique reassortant genotypes of A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses [32, 33] .
Hence, it now is clearly very important to public health, pork production, and veterinary health that novel influenza virus surveillance be conducted within swine farms, especially when the farms are large, have poor biosecurity, and can sustain viral transmission ( Supplementary Figures 1 and 5) . Swabbing pigs as they are taken to market will yield some influenza viruses (prevalence often <2%) [32, 34] , but the height of swine influenza infection activity is among newly weaned pigs [17, 18, 35] . Such piglets may aerosolize the virus without demonstrating major signs of illness [36] . Public health officials must work closely with the swine production companies and their veterinary staff in systematically monitoring the pigs and pig workers for novel swine-lineage IAV infections. It also seems prudent that public health officials strongly encourage swine-exposed workers to receive annual human seasonal influenza vaccines, to use personal protective equipment (eg, masks), and to undergo education programs to help them understand and prevent IAV transmission between people and pigs.
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